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Backbone of the Syrian Revolt 
Inclusion of Rural Sunnis Key for International Efforts to End Conflict 
Khaled Yacoub Oweis 
Syria’s descent into civil war following the military crackdown on the peaceful protest 
movement in 2011 has thrust the country’s rural Sunnis to the forefront. As the civil 
war dragged on, the countryside became the recruiting reservoir for rival jihadist fac-
tions after the demise of the Arab- and Western-backed Free Syrian Army. Divisions 
within the Syrian political opposition based in Istanbul also delayed the formation of a 
provisional government. Foreseeing a strengthened Iran, some of these jihadists have 
put out feelers to the West. Whether and how they could contribute to conflict resolu-
tion needs to be explored. Yet on the ground, the jihadists have largely failed at admin-
istering the areas they have captured. That evolving disparity – disenchantment with 
the militants and lack of appetite for a return to Assad’s rule – offers an opportunity to 
reactivate the dormant opposition government, which Germany initially backed but 
then let drift. 
 
Up to the eve of the Syrian revolt in March 
2011, President Bashar al-Assad’s regime 
maintained that it was immune to Arab 
Spring contagion effects because it was “in 
sync” with its people – unlike Tunisia or 
Egypt. A massive security presence in urban 
centers underpinned a false appearance of 
confidence that betrayed the brittleness of 
the regime under the surface. After crushing 
a violent Islamist and secular opposition, 
culminating in the 1982 sacking of Hama 
and the massacre of thousands of its inhab-
itants, Bashar’s father, Hafez al-Assad, had 
expanded the police state. Cities were 
ringed by security installations whose per-
sonnel were overwhelmingly drawn from 
Assad’s minority Alawite sect.  
Observing the street protests that even-
tually toppled the rulers of Tunisia and 
Egypt at the height of the Arab Spring, the 
Assad regime boosted its security presence 
in Damascus, especially on public squares. 
The relatively looser grip in the countryside 
was a factor contributing to the first major 
demonstrations breaking out in the south-
ern Hauran Plain. As soon as the protests 
began, Assad relied on the Alawite core of 
the regime to respond with force, including 
tanks. Behind infantry and armored units 
came Alawite secret police whose mission 
was to prevent defections. The Fourth Divi-
sion, a praetorian guard led by Assad’s 
brother Maher, spearheaded the crackdown. 
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Sunnis Fall Back on Rural Reservoir 
The uprising took on a Sunni character 
from the outset. Since Bashar became presi-
dent in 2000, the state, the economy, and 
national resources had become increasingly 
concentrated in the hands of the Alawite 
ruling class at the expense of broader soci-
ety, which is mostly Sunni. Minority repre-
sentatives, in particular Syria’s Christian 
clergy, were broadly part of a socio-econom-
ic alliance that underpinned the regime. 
Deployment of security agents in public 
spaces also meant that mosques became the 
main meeting point for demonstrators, 
quickly adding a religious and confessional 
touch to the uprising. Nonetheless, mem-
bers of various minorities took part in the 
protest movement. Their participation 
lessened when the revolt began militarizing 
in the second half of 2011 and regime bom-
bardment pulverized Sunni neighborhoods. 
Military defections were mainly Sunni, 
starting with soldiers from rural regions 
where the regime sent tanks to crush the 
protest movement. Soon rural officers were 
setting up the so-called Free Syrian Army 
(FSA) in July/August 2011. The FSA was 
initially supported by Arab and Western 
nations, whose differences contributed to 
its failure to consolidate into a coherent 
force. Rivalries, especially between Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar, also contributed to the 
failure of the political opposition to unite 
and form a single organization that could 
provide an alternative to Assad. The United 
States, Jordan, and the United Arab Emir-
ates were more reluctant than Turkey, 
Qatar, and Saudi Arabia to back FSA bri-
gades to the point where they would be-
come strong enough to topple Assad. Awash 
with Gulf Arab cash, corruption festered 
among certain FSA units, particularly in 
northern Syria, as they failed to respond to 
the Assad war machine.  
Jihadist Ascendancy 
With the FSA’s reputation sullied, jihadist 
formations began overshadowing the FSA 
in 2012, replacing it as the military core 
fighting Assad’s forces and their Shiite mili-
tia allies from Iran, Lebanon, Iraq, and Af-
ghanistan. In 2013–2015, the jihadists, 
mainly the Qaeda-affiliated Nusra Front, 
Ahrar al-Sham (Free Men of the Levant), and 
Jaish al-Islam (the Army of Islam), seized 
swathes of countryside and rural towns, 
mainly west of the north-south highway in 
the provinces of Hama, Homs, and Deraa, 
in the Ghouta region on the outskirts of 
Damascus, and in the northern provinces of 
Aleppo and Idlib near Turkey.  
While the three groups often feud, they 
share a broad animosity toward the Islamic 
State, the al-Qaeda breakaway whose June 
2014 declaration of a Caliphate in Syria and 
Iraq they regard as dubious on religious 
grounds. The jihadists also distrust officers 
who defected from Assad’s army, partly 
because defectors tend to be less religious 
and are seen as more prone to infiltration 
by the Assad regime. In some regions, the 
groups have imposed strict de facto Islamic 
law. Unlike in areas controlled by the Islam-
ic State, mutilation and beheadings are 
rare, but the rigidness of religious codes, 
such as forcing people to attend prayer, and 
mismanagement of services and infrastruc-
ture, appear to have stoked discontent with 
their rule.  
The jihadists initially capitalized on the 
failure to govern of the FSA and its allies in 
the Istanbul-based National Coalition of 
Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces 
(the Coalition). A functioning opposition 
government was only formed in September 
2013, following prolonged wrangling in the 
Coalition and despite U.S. opposition. By 
then jihadists were in control of extensive 
territory and the Islamic State had advanced 
into the Euphrates Basin in eastern Syria. 
Indeed, the ouster of two Western- and 
Arab-backed FSA units from Idlib by the 
Nusra Front in 2014–2015 appears to have 
been welcomed by local communities 
because the FSA in the north was seen as 
largely corrupt and doing little to dislodge 
the Assad regime.  
But in June 2015, protests broke out in 
areas controlled by the Nusra Front in Idlib 
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and by Jaish al-Islam in Ghouta, demanding 
services and an end to corruption and arbi-
trary arrests. At the same time, resentment 
against Alawite rule in jihadist-held rural 
Syria appears to have remained strong as 
Assad’s air force has continued to hit the 
civilian population with barrel bombs and 
memories of the crackdown on the initially 
peaceful protest movement remain fresh. 
Rural Jihadists at a Glance 
Jaish al-Islam: Led by Saudi-backed cleric 
Zahran Alloush, Jaish al-Islam is active 
in the outskirts of Damascus and the 
Qalamoun Mountains near Lebanon.  
Ahrar al-Sham: Seen as the best organised 
rebel unit, headed by Abu Jaber al-Khafaji, 
an engineer from the countryside near 
Aleppo.  
Nusra Front: Led by Abu Mohammed al-
Golani, also known as al-Fateh (the con-
queror), who is thought to be a Syrian of 
rural origin. Racked by internal divisions, 
the al-Qaeda affiliate remains tough in 
combat. 
Jaish al-Fatah: A northern alliance mainly 
comprised of the Nusra Front and Ahrar al-
Sham. The group captured the provincial 
capital of Idlib from the Assad regime in 
May 2013. 
Assad Regime Plays with Fire 
Prompted by regional calculations, Assad 
helped lay the foundations for the transfor-
mation of the Syrian countryside into a 
jihadist hotbed after the U.S. invasion that 
toppled Saddam Hussein in 2003 and re-
sulted in a strengthened Iran. Despite its 
strong ties with Tehran, the Assad regime 
appeared threatened by the U.S. presence 
next door and sought to undermine the 
transformation of post-Saddam Iraq. The 
Syrian authorities encouraged the emer-
gence of a new breed of jihadist cleric in 
rural regions. Playing the role of agitators, 
these clerics helped recruit fighters to 
infiltrate Iraq, where their jihadist ideology 
was further consolidated.  
Courtship of the jihadists was accompa-
nied by broader tolerance of Islamists, 
which aided the rise of Zahran Alloush. 
Alloush’s father Abdullah, a Ghouta cleric 
living in Saudi Arabia, remains well con-
nected with the Wahhabi clerical estab-
lishment behind the Saudi monarchy. The 
father and son’s brand of austere Islam 
avoided the bellicose rhetoric of the Syrian 
jihadists who went to Iraq and their readi-
ness to brand their enemies as apostates. 
Boosted by his father’s reputation, Zahran 
Alloush preached a more nuanced ideology 
that also appealed to educated city dwellers. 
His religious seminars in Ghouta, for exam-
ple, drew adherents from the northern 
Damascus neighborhood of Barzeh. But 
Alloush was arrested in 2009 as part of a 
crackdown on jihadists who had fought in 
Iraq. Prompted by U.S. pressure, the opera-
tion also extended to more moderate clerics 
seen as having carved out some independ-
ence, such as Alloush. Three months after 
the beginning of the revolt, in June 2011, 
Alloush was released from Sednaya prison 
near Damascus, together with hundreds of 
jihadist veterans of the Iraq conflict. Their 
release helped militarize the Syrian revolt 
and bring a militant leadership to the top 
of its rural core. Alloush himself turned 
more hardline. 
From Preacher to Strongman 
Once free, Alloush, with the help of his 
father, set up what became known as Jaish 
al-Islam, a rebel formation drawn mostly 
from Eastern Ghouta, which is separated 
from Damascus by the contested neighbor-
hood of Jobar. The group’s ideology has 
followed Alloush’s pronouncements, which 
changed as he sought to cast himself as a 
statesman acceptable to international 
powers. In the wake of the military coup 
that ousted Egyptian President Mohamed 
Morsi in 2013, Alloush denounced democ-
racy as a Western ploy. He called for the 
Umayyad Caliphate to be revived and for 
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Syria to be “cleansed” of Alawites. In 2015, 
Alloush dropped his public opposition to a 
representative government and came out as 
a verbal proponent of communal coexist-
ence.  
Militarily, Jaish al-Islam has also read-
justed. In the first two years, inexperience 
and relative weakness caused the death of 
hundreds of rebel recruits in Ghouta in 
ambushes by Assad’s forces and Hezbollah. 
The internal organization of Jaish al-Islam 
slowly improved as the group captured 
large arms depots from the Assad regime 
and extended its supply lines to Jordan, an 
important but unreliable conduit for Saudi 
aid for anti-Assad forces. Jaish al-Islam also 
took over tunnels and crossing points into 
Damascus that enriched combatants and 
profiteers on both sides through informal 
taxation of goods, protection rackets, and 
exorbitant prices.  
Drawing comparisons with the Assad 
family, Alloush promoted his relatives to 
senior positions in Jaish al-Islam and ex-
panded his influence. In 2014 Jaish al-Islam 
expelled several hundred members of the 
Islamic State from eastern Ghouta, most of 
whom had infiltrated the area from their 
home district of Hajar al-Aswad in southern 
Damascus. Jaish al-Islam also routed Jaish 
al-Umma, a local group in Douma that 
started out as a non-ideological rebel force 
but later adopted jihadist rhetoric in rivalry 
with Alloush. Jaish al-Umma launched an 
attack on Damascus in 2012 that shook 
Assad’s grip on the capital but ultimately 
failed.  
Alloush reached an uneasy understand-
ing with larger jihadist groups in the form 
of the Unified Military Command for East-
ern Ghouta. Established in 2014, the nomi-
nal alliance comprises Ahrar al-Sham, 
whose leadership stems mostly from rural 
Hama and Idlib, and Failaq al-Rahman, 
which is led by Abdul Nasser Shumair, a 
former captain in Assad’s army from rural 
Homs. A smaller player in the grouping is 
the Ajnad al-Sham Islamic Union, which is 
linked to Damascene clerics opposed to 
Assad such as Sariya al-Rifai and Osama al-
Rifai, brothers forced into exile in Cairo 
and Istanbul after the revolt. A minor mili-
tary player, Jund al-Sham, links Alloush to 
Damascene clerics and Sunni merchants 
whose priority is for the capital to be spared 
destruction similar to Aleppo. Alloush has 
also been courted by Moaz al-Khatib, the 
former head of the opposition Coalition. 
Khatib, a Damascene, was ousted from the 
Coalition in 2013, partly due to his skepti-
cism of the soundness of confronting Assad 
militarily. Indeed, beyond a brief shelling of 
Damascus in early 2015, which was met by 
accelerated regime barrel bombing, Alloush 
has done little to alter the stalemate with 
Assad’s forces in the capital, focusing in-
stead on consolidating his grip on Eastern 
Ghouta.  
His efforts have been largely successful, 
but at a price. Jaish al-Islam’s local standing 
appears to have taken a beating: In July 
2015, Abu Suleiman Tafour, head of the 
opposition judicial council in Ghouta re-
signed in protest at Jaish al-Islam’s deten-
tion without charge of sixty members of 
Jaish al-Umma. Activist Anas al-Khouli was 
detained for two weeks after filming de-
monstrations against Alloush demanding 
the release of the detainees. These events 
were, however, overshadowed by the killing 
of a demonstrator in an area of the town of 
Hammouriya patrolled by Failaq al-Rahman, 
which led to a crowd seizing and beating 
Failaq al-Rahman’s commander Abdulnaser 
Shumair, after marching on his home. 
Shumair’s public humiliation strengthened 
Alloush as the strongman of Eastern Ghouta.  
Still, Alloush has been dogged by the 
suspected involvement of Jaish al-Islam in 
the December 2013 kidnapping and dis-
appearance of human rights lawyer Razan 
Zaitouneh and three of her comrades. The 
four had fled regime persecution in Damas-
cus to Alloush’s hometown of Douma. 
Fiercely independent, Zaitouneh drew the 
ire of Jaish al-Islam for establishing a net-
work of mostly secular activists and advo-
cating non-violence.  
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Alloush – Pick of Regional Powers 
The disappearance of what became known 
as the “Douma Four” did little to diminish 
outside support for Alloush. Regionally, 
expansion of the Islamic State helped Jaish 
al-Islam be seen as an alternative to more 
extreme groups encroaching on Damascus, 
a specter that has kept Washington practi-
cally opposed to removing Assad and raised 
tension between the United States and 
Saudi Arabia, amongst others. Alloush’s 
Saudi backing appears to have grown after 
Salman bin Abdulaziz succeeded the late 
Abdullah as king in January 2015. Salman 
is seen as having retrenched to the Salafist 
Wahhabist base of the monarchy. One of 
his first initiatives was a proposal for a 
meeting in Saudi Arabia to reorganize the 
Syrian opposition and integrate rebel bri-
gades in the new structure, with a promi-
nent role for Alloush. But the project ap-
pears to have been put on hold, with rifts 
deepening between Saudi Arabia and 
Turkey on one side and other Western and 
Arab members of the Friends of Syria alli-
ance nominally backing the Syrian opposi-
tion, on the other. 
In April 2015, Alloush made a publicized 
trip to Turkey and improved ties with 
Jordan, which is not keen to see Assad fall, 
and says its focus is fighting the Islamic 
State. Jordan is a main ally in the U.S. air 
campaign against the Islamic State, which 
is carried out with the tacit cooperation of 
the Assad regime. As soon as U.S. or allied 
warplanes take off from the Azraq air base 
in Jordan, the Assad regime turns off its air 
defenses to allow the jets to reach Islamic 
State targets in eastern Syria. On a lesser 
scale, the raids have hit the Nusra Front 
and occasionally, Ahrar al-Sham in Idlib 
and Aleppo, while Jaish al-Islam has not 
been targeted.  
Resilience Marks Ahrar al-Sham 
Today, Ahrar al-Sham and the Nusra Front 
dominate the countryside outside Assad’s 
control, except in the southern province of 
Deraa (see SWP Comments 5/2015), where 
the FSA remains a significant player. The 
mostly desert east, which accounts for all of 
Syria’s oil production, has been divided 
between the Assad regime, the Islamic 
State, and Kurdish militias. Demonstrating 
depth of organization, Ahrar al-Sham has 
repeatedly bounced back from major set-
backs, the latest being the death in Septem-
ber 2014 of its leader Hassan Abboud in an 
explosion in Idlib. Abboud was another 
former prisoner released from Sednaya by 
the Assad regime. The attack also killed 
most of Ahrar al-Sham’s top tier, who were 
meeting Abboud amid an internal debate 
about altering the group’s jihadist creed in 
favor of a more pragmatic variety. The new 
approach aimed at expanding cooperation 
with other brigades and outside powers to 
remove Assad and counter the Islamic State.  
A process of moderating Ahrar al-Sham’s 
rhetoric, which was started by Abboud, 
accelerated after his death as the group fell 
under the influence of Turkey. Ankara has 
strengthened ties with militant Islamist 
and other rebel units in northern Syria to 
counter the expansion of Kurdish militias 
on its borders. In an unusual move, in July 
2015 Ahrar al-Sham published opinion 
pieces in two leading Western dailies, 
underlining its openness to talks with the 
United States on how to build a democratic 
alternative to Assad that would protect 
minorities. This contrasted with the group’s 
manifesto emphasizing an “Islamic soci-
ety.” The articles also indicated that Ahrar 
al-Sham could ally with Washington in the 
fight against the Islamic State. In an appar-
ent reference to U.S. help for the Kurdish 
Democratic Union Party (PYD), which is 
pitted against the Islamic State in north-
eastern Syria and distrusted by many Arabs 
for pursuing de facto separatism, Ahrar al-
Sham stated that only a native Syrian Sunni 
alternative could defeat the Islamic State. 
The PYD is an affiliate of the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK), which is branded a 
terrorist organization in the United States, 
Europe, and Turkey. Ahrar al-Sham’s public 
remake appears to have the support of a 
wing that includes the group’s new leader, 
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Abu Jaber al-Khafaji, another former inmate 
of Sednaya prison. But others in leading 
positions are more hardline and many 
rank-and-file members are ideologically 
inspired by al-Qaeda. 
Jihadist Cooperation and its Limits 
The Nusra Front and Ahrar al-Sham are 
members of Jaish al-Fatah, an Islamist 
alliance that was set up in March 2015 in 
apparent coordination with Turkey. It has 
captured most of the province of Idlib 
from the Assad regime and FSA remnants. 
Hoping to emulate that success, in April 
2015 the Nusra Front and Ahrar al-Sham set 
up the “Ansar al-Sharia operations room” 
to capture the contested city of Aleppo. As 
of late July, efforts by anti-Assad forces to 
take the western part of Aleppo have fal-
tered due to regime resistance and rebels 
diverting resources to counter an Islamic 
State incursion into the northern Aleppo 
countryside.  
At the same time, violence between 
Ahrar al-Sham and the Nusra Front persists. 
In 2013 Ahrar al-Sham elbowed out the 
Nusra Front and other rebel brigades to 
take control of the main Bab al-Hawa cross-
ing into Turkey, which has become a sig-
nificant source of revenues from de facto 
tariffs. Early in 2015, Nusra Front fighters 
in the town of Binnij in Idlib killed Judge 
Abu Asyad al-Yemeni, a Yemeni recruit who 
was the main Ahrar al-Sham figure in the 
Islamic Council for the Management of 
Liberated Areas in Idlib Countryside. 
Internal Feuds Weaken Nusra Front 
Lacking the organizational strength of 
Ahrar al-Sham, the Nusra Front appears to 
be fragmenting under the weight of inter-
nal disputes exacerbated by a strong pres-
ence of foreign jihadists. Tensions between 
foreign fighters, known as al-muhajiroun in 
reference to early followers of the Prophet 
who traveled to join him, and Syrian Nusra 
Front members grew after a unit headed by 
a Libyan jihadist known as Abu Abdallah al-
Libi and a Tunisian known as Safina killed 
more than twenty Druze villagers in Idlib 
in June 2015. The massacre came only 
weeks after Abu Muhammed al-Golani, the 
Nusra Front’s leader, had adopted a slightly 
softer tone toward Syria’s minorities, as 
opposed to the Islamic State for example. In 
an interview with Qatari-owned Al Jazeera, 
Golani affirmed that Alawites and Druze 
“need to return to Islam,” but said the 
Nusra Front would spare civilians from the 
two sects. But the interview was a white-
wash and Golani was not asked about an 
incursion by the Nusra Front into the 
Alawite Mountain in Latakia governorate 
in 2013 that resulted in the killing and 
kidnapping of hundreds of mainly Alawite 
civilians. Golani also insisted on what he 
saw as a need to enforce Sharia law, al-
though its arbitrary application appears to 
have alienated some of the group’s rural 
base. A Syrian called Abu Islah, one of the 
Nusra Front’s religious enforcers in Idlib, 
oversaw a public execution of a middle-
aged woman for alleged prostitution in the 
town of Maarat Misreen in January 2015. 
Shortly after this, Abu Islah was assassinat-
ed in apparent revenge, but civilians con-
tinue to be easy targets for erratic edicts. In 
al-Yarmouk camp on the edge of Damascus, 
Nusra Front members executed two Pales-
tinian youths in December 2014 for “cursing 
God.” Several others in the camp were held 
on the same charge but released, apparent-
ly because they were Syrians and came 
from influential families or had relatives in 
other rebel groups. 
Seen as indecisive and not in full control, 
Golani appears to have contributed to the 
Nusra Front’s apparent lack of discipline. 
For example, he allowed a public dispute to 
fester between two main ideological figures 
nominally under his authority. The social 
media feud pitted Abu Marya al-Qahtani, an 
Iraqi who advocated the need to placate the 
local population and cooperate with other 
rebels, against Sami al-Aridi, a Jordanian 
who emphasized a harsher jihadist ap-
proach regardless of any lack of grassroots 
support. Qahtani also warned against 
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currents in the Nusra Front and Ahrar al-
Sham that sympathize with the Islamic 
State and said the Islamic State had infil-
trated Jaish al-Fatah in the north. In a move 
signaling the ascendancy of the hardliners, 
Qahtani was eventually removed from his 
position as ideological head of the Nusra 
Front in 2014 and replaced by Aridi. In July 
2015, a Nusra Front commander known as 
Saleh Hama, who was close to Qahtani, was 
reportedly dismissed. 
Governing Failures 
Highlighting the Nusra Front’s organiza-
tional weakness, its rigid running of daily 
affairs and imposition in 2015 of a religious 
tax in some regions in the north were met 
by apathy or outright opposition, prompt-
ing a subsequent relaxation. In the Idlib 
town of Maarat al-Numaan, situated on the 
main north-south highway connecting 
Damascus and Aleppo, for example, the 
Nusra Front had by mid-2015 eased back on 
closing shops at prayer time and forcing 
their owners attend the mosques. The group 
also backed down from a ban on mosques 
broadcasting religious chants over loud-
speakers during the holy month of Rama-
dan. Nusra Front considers the chants un-
Islamic, but the edict was challenged by 
Ahmad Alwan, a local cleric with a signifi-
cant following.  
The relative leniency of the Nusra Front 
in the region is partly due to Abu al-Hareth, 
the group’s local commander, who is 
from Maarat al-Numaan. While an FSA unit 
known as Brigade 13 also operates in 
Maarat al-Numaan, power belongs to Nusra 
Front, which controls the Sharia-based 
judicial system that replaced the regime. 
Yet, a deterioration in services and the lack 
of a functioning infrastructure in the town 
prompted the Nusra Front to grant the 
newly-elected Local Administrative Council 
a greater role in June 2015. The council is 
part of a civil network linked to the oppo-
sition government, which is based in 
Gaziantep in Turkey. In the education 
sector, opposition government officials 
supervised exams for thousands of students 
in Idlib after Jaish al-Fatah took control of 
the province.  
A local council also operates in Idlib city, 
the provincial capital, but it does not adver-
tise itself. Administratively, Jaish al-Fatah’s 
takeover of Idlib appears to have been a 
debacle, resulting in lawlessness and loot-
ing of public and private property. Under-
scoring the limits to the Nusra Front’s 
tolerance of any presence for the main-
stream political opposition, in July 2015 the 
Front and an allied militia sacked a police 
station linked to the Coalition structures in 
the town of Kfar Nubul in Idlib. The assail-
ants detained the station’s personnel and 
stole cars and other equipment.  
Outside Powers Hesitate 
Following the capture of most of Idlib 
governorate by May 2015, opposition hopes 
were high that Jaish al-Fatah would sweep 
south to the neighboring governorate of 
Hama, home to a major base for Assad’s 
airforce, and break a stalemate pitting 
Sunni and Alawite villages against each 
other in the Ghab Plain west of Hama city. 
But the flow of weapons from Turkey to 
Jaish al-Fatah and FSA units cooperating 
with it appears to have dropped since May 
2015. The slowdown coincided with U.S. 
diplomatic pressure on Turkey and Arab 
Gulf nations to curb support for the mili-
tant Islamists in the north and apparent 
opposition to military operations that 
might weaken Assad to a point where he 
could fall without an alternative acceptable 
to Washington. The mass killing of the 
Druze in Idlib also raised Western fears of 
larger massacres if Jaish al-Fatah were to 
end up in control of Alawite territory. 
Aware of the damage supporting militants 
could do to its relations with Washington, 
Turkey has apparently tried to nudge the 
Nusra Front toward severing its links with 
al-Qaeda, a main reason for the U.S. desig-
nation of the Nusra Front as a terrorist 
group. Golani, mindful of the power of 
foreign fighters within the Nusra Front and 
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their military value in fighting the Assad 
regime, dismissed any such suggestions.  
Conclusion and Recommendations 
With the exception of the Nusra Front, 
Syria’s rural jihadists are leaning toward 
pragmatism. One of the motivations seems 
to be a fear that the July 2015 nuclear deal 
with Tehran could result in increasing 
Iranian support for Assad and a change in 
the military balance. The jihadists have also 
seen how U.S. air support has enabled Kurd-
ish militias to roll back the Islamic State, 
which has been stepping up its attacks on 
anti-Assad forces. Among the jihadists, Jaish 
al-Islam has come closest to positioning 
itself as the Arab Sunni equivalent of the 
Kurdish militia, expecting outside backers 
to turn a blind eye to its brutality as long as 
it fights more extreme groups and does not 
jeopardize Assad’s grip on power.  
With the West indicating through 
stepped up contacts with Alloush that it 
can live with Jaish al-Islam, chances are 
fading that the fate of Razan Zaitouneh, 
an iconic figure of the uprising, will ever 
become known. The impunity with which 
her abduction was carried out will likely 
go down as the death knell of the aspira-
tions of the Syrian revolt for a civic plural-
istic society. At the same time, without the 
engagement of Jaish al-Islam and the hard-
line rural groups no international solution 
can be enforced. Even less ambitious steps, 
such as sparing residential areas from 
fighting, require their agreement because 
the jihadists can scuttle any arrangement 
on the ground.  
Ultimately, ways need to be found to 
prevent a re-emergence of the Alawite 
police state in new guise or a Taliban-style 
takeover. Such prospects appear impossible 
without the departure of Assad, the main 
symbol of Sunni disenfranchisement, and a 
curbing of the power of Alawite security 
operatives. In a new political system, Sunni 
power would also need to be checked, for 
example, through a dual-chamber parlia-
ment. One chamber could be elected by 
outright popular vote in each governorate, 
the second one on a more local basis to give 
sway to minorities.  
But a political solution remains far off, 
even if U.N. Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura 
has contacted jihadist factions. These talks 
need to be widened to reach international 
consensus on cooperating with the jihad-
ists. For example, the Friends of Syria could 
regard whether Ahrar al-Sham facilitates 
the functioning of the opposition govern-
ment as a test for its new rhetoric. In this 
sense, the administrative failure of the 
jihadists offers a renewed opportunity to 
support the moderate opposition to Assad. 
But Turkey, which has narrowed some of 
its differences with Washington over Syria, 
would need to agree to help. 
Since its formation in 2013, the opposi-
tion government has been looking to Ger-
many, which has been engaged in capacity-
building and structural reform, for in-
creased support. Day-to-day funding, which 
has been sourced from Qatar, has been 
intermittent, resulting in operational inter-
ruptions. So far, most German support 
to the government has been channeled 
through an international fund dedicated 
to specific projects. But opposition govern-
ment officials say the mechanism has been 
too slow, especially as an administrative 
gap develops in northern Syria. Faster and 
larger German funding, for example, to 
fill the salary gaps left by sporadic Qatari 
support, would test the opposition’s view 
that the time is ripe to get service and infra-
structure projects off the ground despite 
jihadist control. This would be one of the 
few options left for the West to help pro-
vide an alternative to the Assad dictator-
ship and jihadist rule, as well as help a 
local population in dire need. 
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